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CASES
Injunctive Relief: But Let’s Agree Not To Have It?
Lau Kwan Ho∗
The ability of parties contractually to limit their right to seek injunctive relief has not often been
judicially discussed. An interesting case from Singapore now appears to suggest that this is much
more than a theoretical possibility. Some arguments can, however, be made to demonstrate
that this is perhaps not the vista of opportunity over which some contract draughtsmen might
rejoice, and care should be taken to ascertain the boundaries of the law, as explained in this
note.
The recent decision in CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd1
(Asplenium) saw a rather uncommon issue being raised before the Court of
Appeal of Singapore. Can a party contractually limit its right to seek injunctive
relief, in this case to restrain the counterparty from calling on a performance
bond on the basis that the call was made unconscionably? The court’s reply
was yes, but deeper questions remain unanswered. In particular, the result raises
a number of general issues which have important conceptual and practical
implications.
It should be noted at the outset that the law of Singapore on performance
bonds differs from English law in one significant respect. Both would allow a
party to restrain another from calling on a performance bond on the ground that
the call was made fraudulently, but only Singapore law additionally permits a
restraining order to bemade in cases where the call was made unconscionably. The
‘unconscionability exception’ (as it became known) was judicially introduced
in Singapore to counter the increasing prevalence of abusive calls by bond
beneficiaries, as described in an early case:
We are concerned with abusive calls on the bonds. It should not be forgotten that a
performance bond can operate as an oppressive instrument, and in the event that a
beneficiary calls on the bond in circumstances, where there is prima facie evidence of
fraud or unconscionability, the court should step in to intervene at the interlocutory
stage until the whole of the circumstances of the case has been investigated. It should
also not be forgotten that a performance bond is basically a security for the performance of the
main contract, and as such we see no reason, in principle, why it should be so sacrosanct and
inviolate as not to be subject to the court’s intervention except on the ground of fraud.2
∗Advocate and Solicitor, Singapore.
1 CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd [2015] SGCA 24; [2015] 3 SLR 1041.
2 GHL Pte Ltd v Unitrack Building Construction Pte Ltd [1999] SGCA 60; [1999] 3 SLR(R) 44 at
[24] (emphasis added).
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The Singapore Court of Appeal has since confirmed on multiple occasions that
the unconscionability exception is a separate ground from fraud, and includes
conduct such as unfairness and abuse which are broader than conduct that
would constitute fraud. A finding of unconscionability is therefore a conclu-
sion applied to conduct which is found to be so lacking in bona fides that an
injunction restraining the beneficiary’s substantive rights is warranted.3
Returning to the facts of the Asplenium case, the building contractor there
had, pursuant to a contract with a property developer, requested its bank
to furnish an on-demand performance bond in favour of the developer as
security for the performance and observance of the contractor’s obligations
under the contract. Crucially, however, clause 3.5.8 of the contract provided
that the contractor was not, except in the case of fraud, entitled to restrain the
developer from calling on the bond ‘on any ground including the ground of
unconscionability’. Disagreements arose during the construction project and
the developer called on the bond for the full secured amount. The contractor
pursuant to an ex parte application promptly obtained an interim injunction
restraining payment under the bond. At the subsequent inter partes hearing,
however, the first instance judge, Edmund Leow JC, dismissed the contractor’s
application for an injunction (in reliance on the unconscionability exception)
to restrain the developer from calling on the bond.4
In his ruling the first instance judge held that clause 3.5.8 was unenforceable,
for three reasons: first, it was an attempt to oust the court’s jurisdiction on the
significant ground of unconscionability and represented a severe incursion into
the court’s freedom to grant injunctive relief;5 secondly, the power to grant
injunctions emanated from the court’s equitable jurisdiction and this could not
be circumscribed or curtailed by contract;6 and thirdly, the unconscionabil-
ity exception was based on policy considerations which could not be lightly
brushed aside by agreement.7 However, the judge went on to find that the
threshold had not been met for the unconscionability exception to apply, and
he therefore declined to grant the injunction sought.8
The important question on appeal was whether the judge had been right to
hold that clause 3.5.8 was unenforceable. The Court of Appeal reversed the
judge on this point, reasoning as follows: first, clause 3.5.8, by restricting the
right (except in a fraud situation) to restrain the beneficiary from calling on the
bond, was only seeking to limit the right to an equitable remedy in a particular
situation; this was more in the nature of an exclusion or exception clause
than an ouster of jurisdiction clause. The parties had moreover voluntarily
agreed to the provision. Looked at in this light, neither party had been denied
access to the court. That was not to say that there were no safeguards; such a
clause could at least potentially be subject to judicial scrutiny pursuant to the
3 BS Mount Sophia Pte Ltd v Join-Aim Pte Ltd [2012] SGCA 28; [2012] 3 SLR 352 at [23] and [45].
4 CKR Contract Services Pte Ltd v Asplenium Land Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 266; [2015] 1 SLR 987
(Asplenium (HC)).
5 ibid at [19] and [20].
6 ibid at [21].
7 ibid at [22]-[25].
8 ibid at [27]-[34].
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Singapore equivalent of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 (UCTA).9 The
second strand of the court’s reasoning was that on the facts the developer could
have asked for a cash deposit instead of a performance bond as security, and
there was therefore no pressing reason in principle or policy why clause 3.5.8
should be considered as being contrary to public policy for purporting to oust
the court’s jurisdiction.10 The court did not elaborate further, but the thinking
could perhaps have been that since the parties could have eschewed the courts
altogether, had cash security been transacted, there was in commercially realistic
terms no compelling justification to read clause 3.5.8 as an ouster of jurisdiction
provision. Finally, in concluding that the policy considerations underlying the
unconscionability exception could not be displaced summarily by agreement,
the first instance judge had incorrectly conflated the policy motivations for
developing the unconscionability exception with the general public policy of
invalidating contracts seeking to oust a court’s jurisdiction.11
It is not intended here to debate the theoretical correctness of the uncon-
scionability exception or whether that is a legitimate response to changing
circumstances in a mature but nimble-footed jurisdiction. The remaining dis-
cussion thus proceeds on the footing that the unconscionability exception is a
warranted addition; and, as will be seen, this does not materially detract from
the generality of the discussion that follows. The first issue is whether a provi-
sion like clause 3.5.8, in disentitling a person from specified equitable remedies
on a recognised ground of relief, can properly be analogised to an exclusion
or exception clause (hereafter referred to simply as an exemption clause, for
brevity). The second is to ascertain the limits to contractual autonomy in navi-
gating around a ground of equitable relief that was created precisely to regulate
the conduct of commercial parties.
The resolution of the first issue evidently relies in part on a preliminary
question of framing. In the context of performance bonds, taking away a
party’s right to apply for an injunction on the ground of unconscionability may
appear (as it did to the appeal court in Asplenium) to be no different in concept
from a disclaimer sometimes found in commercial contracts that a party will
not be liable for loss caused through its negligence. Both, it could be argued,
belong to the category of provisions depriving a party of a particular remedy
that might otherwise be available on the facts. It is thought however that there
exists a perceptible difference depending on whether it is a legal or equitable
remedy that is being excluded. The difference is not that an equitable remedy
(unlike a legal one) involves an exercise of judicial discretion which can never
be denied to the court; such a rationalisation is flawed because it is in truth
no more than a mere by-product of the traditional primacy of common law
remedies over the equitable remedies, and in any case it is tolerably clear that
the common law remedies involve a significant degree of facultative decision-
making as well (for example, in respect of questions of causation, the measure
of damages awarded) etc. Rather, the nature of the relief sought to be denied
9 Asplenium n 1 above at [21], [22], [24] and [36].
10 ibid at [31].
11 ibid at [40] and [41].
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is crucial because of the dichotomy of primary and secondary obligations that
exists in the law. Leaving aside the prerogative writs, a fundamental difference
between legal and equitable remedies is that the latter may issue to compel a
party’s contractual performance.12 The tool of choice here is, of course, the
injunction.
A recent and informative discussion may be found inAB vCD.13 It had been
argued there that a limitation clause excluding recovery of certain heads of losses
and capping damages at a predetermined amount reflected the commercial
agreement of the parties, and the limiting effect of this clause thus had to
be considered when the court, in deciding whether to grant an injunction,
addressed its mind to the question whether damages would be an adequate
remedy. The Court of Appeal dismissed the argument. Underhill LJ, with
whom Laws andRyder LJJ agreed, viewed the limitation clause as only affecting
the parties’ secondary obligation to pay damages in the event of a breach. It could
not affect the primary obligation of the parties to perform the contract, in the
sense that an agreement to restrict the recoverability of damages in the event of
a breach could not be treated as an agreement to excuse performance of that
primary obligation.14 Seen in this light, the court, when deciding whether to
order an injunction to enforce compliance with the primary obligations under
the contract, was not to consider the effect of such a limitation clause.
The reasoning in AB v CD appears, with respect, to be sound in principle.
It gives the proper understanding to injunctive relief as being
a remedy available to the court to give effect to commercial expectations where it
is in the interests of justice that agreed obligations should continue to be binding
on the parties, whether that be for an interim period or the term of the contract.15
What is particularly interesting is Ryder LJ’s further statement that the court’s
remedies were, on the facts there, available in support of a contractual right and
were not excluded by the terms of the contract.16 This seems to open the possibility for
an argument that the terms of the contract could exclude a party’s right to apply
for injunctive relief; and Asplenium, as we have seen, accepts that argument.17
The normative justification for this almost invariably reduces to the freedom of
parties to contract, that they may, subject to the limits of the law, contractually
amend the content and performance of their primary obligations.18 But even
on this view it cannot be said that clauses limiting the availability of equitable
relief to compel contractual performance are sufficiently analogous to those that
limit purely legal remedies, such that the usual interpretative rules applicable
12 See generally S. Rowan, Remedies for Breach of Contract – A Comparative Analysis of the Protection of
Performance (Oxford: OUP, 2012) ch 1.
13 AB v CD [2014] EWCA Civ 229; [2015] 1 WLR 77.
14 ibid at [27].
15 ibid at [32].
16 ibid at [32].
17 See also Tercon Contractors Ltd v British Columbia 2010 SCC 4; [2010] 1 SCR 69 at [132] and
[133].
18 See, for example, D. Neo, ‘Banking Law’ (2014) 15 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review of
Singapore Cases 73, para 5.42.
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to the latter may be utilised in respect of the former.19 Rather, the analysis of
clauses limiting specific equitable relief should in fact be stricter because it is
harder to contemplate that parties would have foregone the right to compel
the performance of their contract (this naturally excepts certain categories of
agreement for which specific performance and perpetual injunctive relief are
not traditionally ordered). The facts of Asplenium illustrate this necessity for
a more rigorous approach. The contractor there was unable to restrain the
developer from calling on the bond due to the presence of clause 3.5.8, and
despite the court’s insistence that there were safeguards in place to regulate
the use of such clauses, it is unclear whether these as stated are any salve to a
general and (perhaps) increasingly persistent phenomenon. By its own terms
UCTA is not always applicable to the contract at hand, and the evaluative
questions that are traditionally asked when construing exemption clauses for
legal remedies simply do not address the different and vastly more fundamental
query whether the parties objectively intended to allow deviations from the
primary performance of the contract to go unpenalised without recourse to
any injunctive remedies. As Bean on Injunctions recognises:
It is comparatively unusual for the defendant to be able to say that damages are the
only available remedy in the case and that the court does not even have a discretion
to grant an injunction.20
The right to expect contractual performance is generally allied to a right to
seek equitable relief to compel such performance. Excluding or limiting this
concomitant right should properly necessitate a heightened level of inquiry,
where the court’s assessment is based on the relevant material before it and
even the conduct of the parties, where that is admissible in evidence, with
appropriate sentiment to be derived from Megarry V-C’s dictum that the courts
must beware of allowing a restriction of the range of remedies which it is proper
to grant to destroy or unduly impair the rights of the parties.21
This brings us to the second issue, which is whether there are any limits to
contractual autonomy in navigating around a ground of equitable relief created
precisely to regulate the conduct of commercial parties. Theway this inquiry has
been presented may faintly resemble a catch-22, but it is essentially the problem
the court faced in Asplenium. Its resolution has broader implications not just in
terms of the immediate ability of parties to affect the availability of equitable
injunctive relief, but also in introducing an overlap to the traditionally held
view that liability for certain types of conduct (such as fraud and dishonesty)
may not be limited or excluded on public policy grounds.
The result in Asplenium, it will be remembered, was that unconscionability
as a ground for restraining calls on a performance bond could be excluded
contractually by the parties. The appeal court did not see any policy consid-
erations against such a result and, in fact, thought that the first instance judge
19 cf P. G. Turner, ‘Inadequacy in Equity of Common Law Relief: The Relevance of Contractual
Terms’ (2014) 73(3) Cambridge Law Journal 493, 496.
20 D. Bean, I. Parry and A. Burns, Injunctions (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 11th ed, 2012) para 2-09.
21 Thomas Marshall (Exports) Ltd v Guinle [1979] Ch 227, 243.
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had confused the policy motivations for developing the unconscionability ex-
ception with the general public policy of invalidating contracts seeking to oust
a court’s jurisdiction.22 With respect, however, this seems to have recast the
concerns of the first instance judge. Leow JC’s stated view is that the important
policy considerations underpinning the unconscionability exception cannot
be lightly brushed aside by an agreement made by the parties.23 He appears
only to be saying here that the parties cannot easily avoid the unconscionabil-
ity exception or its underlying policy; and he does not, in fairness, suggest
definitively in any way that he finds the policy motivations of the uncon-
scionability exception to be coterminous with the general public policy con-
cerns over jurisdiction-ousting contracts. If this correctly reads the first instance
judge’s words then, respectfully, he was right to have drawn attention to this
quandary.
It is true that the unconscionability exception was created in Singapore
after much deliberation and thought—this representing a conscious deviation
from English law on the subject—and it has, for all practical purposes, been
understood by many lawyers in Singapore to exist on the same plane as the fraud
exception. This is no doubt due to the understanding there (as in England) that
there are extremely limited grounds on which to restrain a beneficiary from
calling on or receiving payment under a performance bond. One has only to
read the recent decisions in Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd24 (Ensus) and
Doosan Babcock Ltd v Comercializadora de Equipos y Materiales Mabe Limitada25
(Doosan Babcock) to realise how inordinately difficult it was to accept that a
second exception existed in English law, in addition to the fraud ground. It
might therefore have been thought that any exception, once recognised and
given legitimacy by the law, would not easily permit of derogation. The true
policy at work here is that of ensuring that parties do not contract themselves
out of the law.26
It may be asked what makes this different from those cases in which the law
does allow for the limitation of liability which would otherwise be imposed;
that extends, as we know, not just to legal liability (such as for consequential
losses, loss of profits, or loss caused through negligence etc) but even liabil-
ity in equity as well (for instance, trustees may legitimately disclaim liability,
including for gross negligence, save for wilful default).27 Moreover, an argu-
ment may now possibly be mounted, based on certain statements in the Ensus
and Doosan Babcock cases cited earlier, that the ambit of action in restraining
a call may be contractually defined in such a way as to disallow a party from
relying on the unconscionability exception. It is, however, thought that the
contractual estoppel doctrine espoused in Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and
22 n 11 above.
23 Asplenium (HC) n 4 above at [22] and [25].
24 Simon Carves Ltd v Ensus UK Ltd [2011] EWHC 657 (TCC); [2011] BLR 340.
25 Doosan Babcock Ltd v Comercializadora de Equipos y Materiales Mabe Limitada [2013] EWHC 3201
(TCC).
26 To quote Branson J in Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc v Nelson [1937] 1 KB 209, 221.
27 See, for example, Spread Trustee Company Ltd v Hutcheson [2011] UKPC 13; [2012] 2 AC 194.
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New Zealand Banking Group Ltd28 cannot convincingly be relied on here as the
policy considerations surrounding exemption clauses warrant their own distinct
analysis.
The response to this is threefold. As mentioned earlier, a limitation on
liability (liability here meaning the secondary obligations that result from the
breach of a primary obligation) cannot fully be compared to a limitation of an
equitable remedy, simply because they address different aspects of the contract.
The former generally rises to act only upon the secondary obligations of the
parties, while the latter is a direct impingement on the rights of the parties
to affect the method of performing and discharging their present (and future)
primary obligations. This can be easily appreciated: the fact that I may not be
able to claim for loss caused by your negligent behaviour does not mean that I
have necessarily and voluntarily withdrawn from the other remedies available
(such as declaratory or injunctive relief). If a comparison is insisted upon
then the better parallel is as between a provision touching on the election of
remedies and a clause seeking to limit the right to seek specific equitable relief.
Clearly, then, it is conceptually possible to neutralise completely (and without
leaving any other viable remedy) the right to ask for damages or any injunctive
remedies, but that would be something so out of line with ordinary commercial
expectations that it would take extremely cogent evidence to demonstrate that
the parties intended for this to be the position. The following words of Moore-
Bick LJ were said in a slightly different context but they are capable of general
application:
The court is unlikely to be satisfied that a party to a contract has abandoned
valuable rights arising by operation of law unless the terms of the contract make it
sufficiently clear that that was intended. The more valuable the right, the clearer
the language will need to be.29
This leads to the second point, which is that if the parties do wish to effectively
strip the availability of a crucial equitable remedy from their relationship, the
court has to be concerned to ensure generally that there remain other viable
avenues of recourse to compel the performance of the primary obligations.30
This safeguarding aspect is not addressed only by the application of legisla-
tion (eg, UCTA) and the usual attendant rules relating to the interpretation
of exemption clauses, but requires further a commercially sensible analysis of
the contract to understand what the parties intended when they provided for
the discharge (or breach) of a primary obligation to have certain consequences
or non-consequences, taking into account the ordinary meaning of the words
28 Peekay Intermark Ltd v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 386;
[2006] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 511.
29 Stocznia Gdynia SA v Gearbulk Holdings Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 75; [2010] QB 27 at [23].
30 In some ways this is the obverse inquiry to that posed in S. Rowan, ‘For the Recognition
of Remedial Terms Agreed Inter Partes’ (2010) 126 LQR 448, where the author argues that
contracting parties should be permitted to agree upfront in their contract on their entitlement to
equitable relief (such as specific performance or mandatory injunctions) even if this would oust
the court’s exercise of discretion in awarding the remedy, so as to further the protection of the
performance interest in their contract. See also Rowan, n 12 above, ch 5.
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used, relevant evidence aliunde and, importantly, the furtherance of the fun-
damental policy of ensuring that parties should perform, and should ordinarily
be entitled to compel performance of, their agreements. It is emphasised again
that this policing role does not, under the present analysis, conflict in principle
with a (exemption) clause which prescribes capped or liquidated damages in
the event of a breach or which is extremely comprehensive in scope such as
to affect virtually all the secondary obligations that arise; such a clause would
not in itself assist in understanding the proper scope of the equitable reme-
dies which should, considering all the circumstances, be available to compel
performance.31
The third note of response specifically addresses the propriety of any poten-
tial restriction on the right to injunctive relief in a performance bonds context,
such as clause 3.5.8 found in Asplenium. It is arguable, given the nature and
usage of performance bonds, that there is a numerus clausus of exceptions on
which to restrain calls and payment thereunder. The significance of the As-
plenium decision, as far as Singapore law is concerned, is in allowing parties
to deduct at will one of these very few exceptions, leaving fraud as the only
generally recognised ground available for use. This appears to be a one-way
street in that only the unconscionability ground (but not the fraud ground)
may be derogated from; and, to be sure, nothing in Asplenium suggests that the
elimination of the fraud exception is even a remote possibility.32 But this is also
why the actual decision in that case to validate clause 3.5.8 is questionable. In
allowing for the exclusion of the unconscionability exception there has been
an implicit hierarchical decision to place this below the fraud exception. That,
granted, is a policy decision, but arguably a more balanced analysis of the rel-
evant policy considerations would have resulted in favour of equality. Indirect
authority may be drawn from Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd,33 where
the Court of Appeal confirmed that exemption clauses would not naturally
be construed as purporting to exclude liability for fraud or wilful damage,
going on to find in that case that a clause which excluded liability ‘in any
circumstances’ was not effective to exclude liability for fraud or malice.34 In
my view the unconscionability exception, in attacking the problem of abusive
calls and targeting conduct which is unfair and lacking in bona fides, falls within
this sphere of general immunity from contractual manipulation. From this it
follows that the same immunity should normally apply to the second, distinct,
exception recognised by Akenhead J in Ensus; the exception being that if the
underlying contract, in relation to which the bond has been provided by way
of security, clearly and expressly prevents the beneficiary party to the contract
from making a demand under the bond, that party can potentially be restrained
on this ground from making such a demand.35 Therefore if a particular con-
tract should so provide, then, notwithstanding that another clause may at the
31 See also Cavendish Square Holding BV v Talal El Makdessi [2015] UKSC 67 at [298]. Elsley v JG
Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd [1978] 2 SCR 916.
32 cf D. Neo, ‘Banking Law’ (2014) 15 Singapore Academy of Law Annual Review of Singapore Cases
73, para 5.43.
33 Regus (UK) Ltd v Epcot Solutions Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 361; [2009] 1 All ER (Comm) 586.
34 ibid at [34] and [35].
35 Ensus n 24 above at [33].
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same time limit the availability of injunctive relief to the case of fraud, the
expectation that contracting parties will not act in bad faith (or, conversely,
that they will act in good faith) means that it should still be very hard to justify
the denial of an injunction if the beneficiary was not entitled to call on the
bond in the first place. This would be to give true meaning to the aphorism
that people expect and are entitled to nothing less than honest dealing in their
relationships.
Attribution and the Illegality Defence
Ernest Lim∗
In Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquidation) all seven judges of the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeal by holding that the illegality defence could not be raised against
the claim made by the company because the wrongdoing of the directors and shareholder cannot
be attributed to the company. Although all the judges unanimously agreed on the outcome of
the case, their reasoning concerning the approach to attribution and the different circumstances
under which attribution should or should not take place differed. Further, the Supreme Court
was divided on the issue of the correct approach to the illegality defence.
INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Supreme Court in Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Ltd (in liquida-
tion)1 (Bilta) is significant and interesting for two reasons. First, it authoritatively
resolves the issue of whether the wrongful acts or state of mind of the direc-
tors (or the sole director and shareholder) are attributable to the company
where the latter sues the former for breach of duty and their co-conspirators
for dishonest assistance. In so doing, the Supreme Court clarified the gen-
eral approach that should be taken towards analysing the difficult subject of
attribution, and it provided clear and forceful clarification of what the con-
troversial decision in Stone & Rolls Ltd (in liquidation) v Moore Stephen (a firm)2
(Stone & Rolls) is authority for. Second, the judges were divided on the issue
concerning the correct approach to the illegality defence. Lords Toulson and
Hodge said that the application of the illegality defence requires the evaluation
and balancing of competing public policies but Lord Sumption rejected this.
Lord Neuberger (with whom Lords Clarke and Carnwath agreed) did not take
a position. Depending on the approach that is adopted, the judges said that
∗Associate Professor of Law, University of Hong Kong. I would like to thank Paul S. Davies and
the two anonymous referees for helpful comments and John Lowry for encouragement. The usual
caveats apply.
1 [2015] UKSC 23; [2015] 2 WLR 1168; see W. Day, ‘Attributing Illegalities’ (2015) 74 CLJ 409.
2 [2009] 1 AC 1391.
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the House of Lords decision in Tinsley v Milligan3 (Tinsley) may have to be
reconsidered.4
FACTS AND DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The liquidator of the company, Bilta, sued its directors and co-conspirators for
breach of duty and dishonest assistance in connection with a carousel fraud
on the Revenue which involved Bilta purchasing ‘carbon credits’ in the EU
from one conspirator and therefore not subject to VAT, which was followed by
their resale (which was subject to VAT) at a loss to other companies, with the
proceeds of the sale remitted to other companies controlled by the defendants.
The point of this fraudulent scheme was to cause Bilta to be insolvent so that
it could not pay the VAT to the Revenue. The defendants argued that the
company’s claim should be dismissed on the basis of the illegality defence (ie,
no court will give effect to a claim founded on an illegal or immoral act) because
the fraud of its directors should be attributed to the company. They also alleged
that because section 213 of the Insolvency Act 1986 has no extraterritorial
effect, the claim under that section should be dismissed.
The Court of Appeal ruled in favor of the claimant.5 Patten LJ held that that
the fraud of the directing mind and will should not be attributed to company
to defeat its claim against the directors or co-conspirators for breach of duties
and the tort of conspiracy. To make such an attribution would violate the
principle of separate legal personality, and more importantly, would be contrary
to sections 172(3) and 178 of the Companies Act 2006 and the Insolvency Act.
He also said that on a proper construction of section 213 of Insolvency Act, it
had extraterritorial effect. The defendants appealed to the Supreme Court.
All seven judges of the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court
of Appeal, on both the attribution and extraterritorial issues. Lord Neuberger
(with whom Lords Clarke and Carnwath agreed) held that
Where a company has been the victim of wrong-doing by its directors, or of which
its directors had notice, then the wrong-doing, or knowledge, of the directors
cannot be attributed to the company as a defence to a claim brought against the
directors by the company’s liquidator, in the name of the company and/or on behalf
of its creditors, for the loss suffered by the company as a result of the wrong-doing,
even where the directors were the only directors and shareholders of the company,
and even though the wrong-doing or knowledge of the directors may be attributed
to the company in many other types of proceedings.6
Lords Sumption, Toulson and Hodge differed in their reasoning, although
they arrived at the same result as Lords Neuberger and Mance. Lord Sumption
3 [1994] 1 AC 340.
4 Bilta n 1 above at [17] and [174].
5 [2013] EWCA Civ 968; [2013] 3 WLR 1167; see E. Lim, ‘Attribution in Company Law’ (2014)
77 MLR 794.
6 Bilta n 1 above at [7].
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decided the case on the basis of attribution.7 Lords Toulson and Hodge decided
this case primarily on the basis that to apply the illegality defence would
undermine the protection that the law accords to the creditors of a company
that is in or near insolvency by requiring directors to take into account their
interests.8 They said that in any event, the rules of attribution would achieve
the same result. Moreover, although Lord Sumption and Lords Toulson and
Hodge differed in their understanding of Stone & Rolls,9 Lord Neuberger10 as
well as Lords Toulson and Hodge11 said that Stone & Rolls is authority for a
very narrow point: the illegality defence succeeded and the claim against the
auditors failed. Lord Neuberger even stated that ‘the time has come in my view
for us to hold that the decision in Stone & Rolls should, as Lord Denning MR
graphically put it in relation to another case in In Re King [1963]; Ch 459, 483,
be “put on one side and marked ‘not to be looked at again’”.’.12
Despite these important differences in their reasoning, the most interest-
ing one concerns the correct approach to the illegality defence. While Lords
Toulson and Hodge said that the application of the illegality defence has to
be sensitive to context and considerations of competing public policies,13 Lord
Sumption rejected such a flexible, discretionary approach.14 Lord Neuberger
acknowledged that both approaches are supportable but did not make a deter-
mination on this issue.15 This note argues in favour of the flexible approach.
ATTRIBUTION
On the issue of attribution, the Supreme Court’s decision is important in three
respects. The first is that it is clear authority for the proposition that where a
company (acting through its liquidator) sues its directors for breach of duties
for the losses caused to it by the directors, their wrongful acts or state of mind
cannot be attributed to the company, even if the directors are the only directors
and shareholders of the company (ie, a ‘one-man’ company). This is because
it would be absurd and unjust, and it would defeat the purpose underlying
section 172(3) of the Companies Act 2006 (the Act), if the miscreant directors
can escape liability simply by attributing their wrongdoing to the company.
Secondly, the Court set out the correct approach to answering the question
of whether and when the acts or state of mind of the directors (or their third
party co-conspirators) or agents should be attributed to the company. Lord
Neuberger and Lord Mance held that it depends on the nature and the factual
context of the claim in question, thereby endorsing Lord Hoffmann’s dictum
in Meridian: ‘Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose
7 ibid at [86].
8 ibid at [125]-[130].
9 The other difference lies in the judges’ interpretation of Safeway Stores v Twigger [2010] EWCA
Civ 1472.
10 Bilta n 1 above at [24].
11 ibid at [154].
12 ibid at [30].
13 ibid at [170]-[174].
14 ibid at [60]-[63], [98]-[100].
15 ibid at [15]-[17].
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intended to count as the act etc. of the company?’16 This contextual, purposive
approach is different from that articulated by Lord Sumption, with which Lord
Mance17 disagreed and which was endorsed by none of the other judges Lord
Sumption analysed this case as one involving the rules of attribution–one of
which is that the acts or state of mind of the directing mind and will shall be
attributed to the company–‘derived from the law of agency’,18 which apply
‘regardless of the nature of the claim or the parties involved’,19 but which can be
negatived by the exception of the breach of duty by the agents.20 The problem
with analysing it as one of prima facie attribution, which is then negatived under
a breach of duty exception, is that it implies that the rules of attribution should
automatically apply (unless the exception applies), ie, it wrongly assumes that the
principal is to be treated for all intents as always having the same knowledge as
his agents.21 Such knowledge cannot be attributed to the principal unless the
purpose of such attribution, which can only be discerned from the nature and
context of the claim, is first articulated; thus, where the agent has defrauded
the principal, the exception is unnecessary to allow the principal to succeed
in its claim given that the agent’s knowledge will not be attributed to the
principal in the first place.22 Indeed, ‘[t]he rules of attribution do not exist
in a state of nature, such that some reason [such as breach of duty] has to
be found to disapply them’.23 Nevertheless, an advantage arising from Lord
Sumption’s approach is that it provides more certainty than the contextual
approach endorsed by the majority.
Although it is clear from the Court’s holding that the contextual, purposive
approach to attribution is the correct one to follow, the precise basis on which
attribution should or should not apply in the different contexts is not clear.
This is because while Lord Neuberger explicitly endorsed the result reached
by Lord Sumption as well as Lords Toulson and Hodge on the attribution
issue, he did not examine their reasoning in detail; nor did he express a clear
view as to whose reasoning is to be preferred with respect to claims made
by a company against its delinquent directors and third party co-conspirators.
While the directors’ wrongful act or state of mind will not be attributed to the
company in order to bar a company’s claim against them and the third party
co-conspirators, the judges are not in accord as to the reasons. Lords Toulson
and Hodge analysed it principally from a statutory policy standpoint: allowing
the illegality defence to succeed and attributing the fraud of the directors
to the company would negate and contradict the protection afforded to the
creditors of a company which is insolvent or approaching insolvency through
16 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 2 AC 500, 507.
17 Bilta n 1 above at [37].
18 ibid at [86].
19 ibid (emphasis added).
20 ibid.
21 P. Watts and F. Reynolds (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 20th
ed, 2014) at [8-213] endorsed by Lord Mance at [44] and Lords Toulson and Hodge at [191].
22 ibid.
23 P. Watts and F. Reynolds (ed), Bowstead & Reynolds on Agency (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 19th
ed, 2010) at [8-213], endorsed by Lord Mance at [44] and Lords Toulson and Hodge at [191].
NB, these paragraphs of the judgment referred to both 2010 and 2014 editions of this text.
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the statutory requirement (sections 172(3) and 180(5) of the Act) that directors
must take into account the creditors’ interests in such a company.24
Lord Sumption took a different view.He said that just as directors cannot raise
the illegality defence by attributing their wrongdoing to the company when
they are being sued for breaching the duties that they owed to the company, so
must be the case for their co-conspirators who are under an ancillary liability
for participating in the wrongdoing of the fraudulent directors.25 He rejected
Lords Toulson and Hodge’s policy based reasoning because first, the application
of the illegality defence does not permit the weighing or evaluation of public
policies.26 Secondly, he disagreed that there are countervailing public policies
underlying sections 172(3) and 180(5), which require the illegality defence to
be disapplied so that liability can be imposed on directors.27 Finally, he found
that this case was about attribution.28
Lord Sumption’s first reason does not seem well-supported by authorities.
This is because none of the authorities29 cited by him addressed, let alone
decided, the question of whether the illegality defence should apply if doing
so would undermine or defeat the operation of another rule of law, particular
a statutory provision. This question, according to Lords Toulson and Hodge, is
the central issue in Bilta.
It might be said that because Lords Toulson and Hodge analysed the adverse
effect of the application of the illegality defence on the creditors, their reason-
ing is inconsistent with Apotex. There, Lord Sumption said that the illegality
defence does not permit the court ‘to make a value judgment about the seri-
ousness of the illegality and the impact on the parties of allowing the defence’.30
A closer analysis of Lords Toulson and Hodge’s reasoning, however, shows that
it is not contrary to Apotex. This is because their discussion of the adverse
consequences on the claimant is a result of their analysis of the contravention
of the common law and statutory rule protecting creditors’ interests, should
the illegality defence be allowed to succeed. The consequences on the claimant
are merely collateral to the central and determinative issue of whether allowing
the illegality defence to succeed would undermine the policy and purpose of
the statutory provisions.
Equally important, it would be remarkable if a rule of law derived from the
common law, such as the illegality defence, is to bemechanically applied if doing
so would frustrate the operation of a statute. After all, proper consideration has
to be given to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty (ie, an Act overrides, or
directly or indirectly modifies, inconsistent provisions of pre-existing statutory
or common law);31 the principle that courts should avoid reaching an outcome
24 Bilta n 1 above at [207], [126]-[131], [166]-[167].
25 ibid at [90].
26 ibid at [99]-[102].
27 ibid at [104].
28 ibid at [105].
29 Tinsley vMilligan n 3 above; Les Laboratoires Servier v Apotex Inc [2014] UKSC 55; [2014] 3 WLR
1257 (Apotex).
30 Apotex ibid at [19].
31 O. Jones (ed), Bennion on Statutory Interpretation (London: LexisNexis, 6th ed, 2013) 167-168,
171.
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that allows the common law to defeat the operation of a statutory provision
thereby depriving the claimant of civil remedies intended by parliament, such
as the case in Bilta; and the principle that courts should avoid arriving at a
decision that involves accepting an anomalous legal rule or doctrine.32 Un-
surprisingly, Lord Neuberger concluded that ‘a claim against directors under
section 172(3) cannot be defeated by the directors invoking the defence of ex
turpi causa’.33
On Lord Sumption’s second reason, he disagreed that the policies underlying
section 172(3) require directors to be subject to liability despite the illegality
defence; this is in part because the company is permitted under sections 180(4)
and (5) to authorise directors’ breaches of duty which would otherwise be
unlawful, thereby exempting them from any liability.34 But the authorisation
is expressly permitted by the statute. Thus, unless there are express statutory
provisions exempting directors from liability or waiving the duties of directors,
sections 172(3) and 180(5), which require directors to consider or act in the
creditors’ interests, should not be defeated by the application of the illegality
defence, a common law rule.
The above analysis concerns claims made by a company against the delin-
quent directors and/or its third party co-conspirators. In the context of a third
party who is not a conspirator to the wrongdoing committed by the company’s
directors or agents, the Court could have provided clearer guidance on the
circumstances under which the acts or knowledge of the delinquent company’s
directors or agents should be attributed to the company in order to bar the
company’s claim against that third party. Lords Toulson and Hodge said that it
‘depends on the nature of the claim’35 but without laying down any general
principle. It is suggested that where a third party has breached a duty that it
owes to the company, the acts or state of mind of the delinquent directors are
not attributable to the company to bar its claim against the third party. Other-
wise, third parties can simply breach the duties that they owe to the company
and yet are insulated from liability. But the difficulty arises if it is a ‘one-man’
company suing a third party.
This brings us to the third and final important aspect of Bilta, which is
the Court’s interpretation of the significance of Stone & Rolls. There, the sole
director and sole beneficial shareholder defrauded certain banks. The company’s
liquidator alleged that the auditors breached their duty by failing to detect
the fraud. The auditors accepted that they were in breach of their duty and
conceded that but for their breach, the fraud would have been detected earlier.
The liquidator sought to recover from the auditors the losses caused by the
extension of the period of fraud. The auditors raised the illegality defence and
succeeded. Given the intractable difficulty in extracting any ratio from that
case and in the light of trenchant academic criticisms, Lord Neuberger clarified
that it is authority only for this point and nothing more: ‘on the facts of the
particular case, the illegality defence succeeded and that the claim should be
32 ibid, 890.
33 Bilta n 1 above at [20].
34 ibid at [104].
35 ibid at [207].
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struck out’.36 Nonetheless, Lords Neuberger37 and Mance38 agreed with two
of the propositions that Lord Sumption39 derived from Stone & Rolls. The first
is that the illegality defence cannot apply to bar the company’s claim against
a third party in connection with the fraud perpetrated on it by its directing
mind and will where there are innocent shareholders or directors. The second
proposition is that where a ‘one-man’ company sues a third party, the latter
could raise the illegality defence in certain circumstances (such as those in Stone
& Rolls) where it was not involved in the dishonesty and there are no innocent
shareholders or directors.
On the first proposition, it is submitted that even where there are no innocent
shareholders or directors, a third party should still be precluded from raising
the illegality defence to bar a ‘one-man’ company’s claim against the latter for
breach of duty if: (i) in a tortious action, the nature and extent of losses sustained
by the company is within the scope of the third party’s duty; and (ii) the sole
director and shareholder does not profit from the damages that are recoverable
from the third party (through mechanisms such as contribution proceedings).40
It is crucial to determine the scope of a third party’s duty because, for example,
a critical issue in Stone & Rolls41 is whether the scope of duty in tort of the
third party in that case (auditors) extends to the protection of the interests of
creditors of an insolvent company (which the majority answered in the negative,
but Lord Mance dissented). It is important to ensure that the wrongdoer (ie, a
delinquent director/shareholder) does not profit from his wrongdoing because
that is a key rationale underlying the illegality defence. Further, a third party
should not be able to raise the illegality defence against a claim made by a ‘one-
man’ company because the law draws a distinction between the interest and
state of mind of the company and that of the sole director and shareholder who
has defrauded the company: a sole shareholder or the whole body of shareholders
cannot ‘validly consent to their own appropriation of the company’s assets for
purposes which are not the company’s’.42
On the second proposition, Lord Neuberger clarified that the court should
not ‘purport definitively to confirm’43 that Stone & Rolls has the effect of
barring a company’s claim against auditors where the company was insolvent
or near insolvent at the relevant audit date. However, with respect, this is
36 ibid at [24].
37 ibid at [26].
38 ibid at [50].
39 ibid at [80]. The other proposition that Lord Sumption derived from Stone & Rolls was rejected
by Lords Neuberger (at [29]) and Mance (at [50]), ie, the illegality defence is only available where
the company is directly, as opposed to vicariously, responsible for the illegality.
40 E. Lim, n 5 above, 804-805. However, where the sole director and shareholder of a company
has defrauded a solvent company, Lord Mance (in Stone & Rolls at [256]) stated that the auditor
can rely on the illegality defence in order to bar the claim by the one-man company against it
because the auditor cannot be said to have breached its duty in failing to draw the attention of
the owner to his own fraud, as the sole shareholder cannot allege that he does not know of, or is
misled by, the fraud.
41 ibid per Lord Phillips at [67]-[68]. See also Bilta n 1 above at [135] and [152] per Lords Toulson
and Hodge.
42 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 2 AC 415 at [41] per Lord Sumption (emphasis added). See
also Stone & Rolls n 2 above at [230] per Lord Mance.
43 Bilta n 1 above at [28].
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unsatisfactory. It has been astutely observed that ‘[u]ltimately, what divided
the judges in Stone & Rolls was determining the classes of innocent parties
whose interests the contract of audit is designed to protect’.44 And given that
the majority (particularly Lords Phillips and Walker) held that the protection
of creditors’ interests is outside the scope of the auditors’ duty, the Supreme
Court in Bilta could have said that either Stone & Rolls was wrongly decided
(and therefore the second proposition would not apply to an insolvent or near-
insolvent company), or because it was correctly decided, the second proposition
would, as a matter of logic, apply. To say that ‘we ought not shut the point
out’45 without providing further guidance is, with respect, unsatisfactory.
Despite the Court providing helpful clarification on the issue of attribution,
the majority46 did not articulate what the correct approach to the illegality
defence is, although Lords Sumption, Toulson and Hodge did. Nevertheless,
the judges recognised that it is vital to make a determination of the correct
approach in future cases. The next section of this note will only briefly evaluate
these approaches given space constraints and because it is not the determinative
issue in Bilta.
ILLEGALITY DEFENCE
For ease of exposition, the current approaches to the illegality defence can be,
broadly speaking, divided into the strict and flexible approaches. The clearest
authority in support of the strict approach can be found in Tinsley v Milligan,
which was affirmed in Apotex,47 as well as in Lord Sumption’s dicta in Bilta.
The flexible approach is exemplified in Hounga v Allen48 (Hounga) which was
endorsed by Lords Toulson and Hodge in Bilta.49
Under the strict approach, the application of the illegality defence ‘allows
no room for the exercise of any discretion by the court in favour of one party
or the other’50 and ‘is indiscriminate and so can lead to unfair consequences
between the parties to litigation’,51 thereby ‘capable of producing injustice’.52
Lord Sumption observed that it is ‘bound to confer capricious benefits on
defendants some of whom have little to be said for them in the way of merits
. . . ’53 He said that the court is required to apply the illegality defence (which
is based on a rule of law) in every case to which it applies.54 Crucially, he
emphasised that ‘[i]t is not a discretionary power on which the court is merely
entitled to act, nor is it dependent upon a judicial value judgment about the
44 P. Watts, ‘Audit contracts and turpitude’ (2010) 126 LQR 14.
45 Bilta n 1 above at [28] per Lord Neuberger.
46 ibid per Lords Neuberger (with whom Lords Clarke and Carnwath agreed) and Mance.
47 n 29 above.
48 [2014] UKSC 47; [2014] 1 WLR 2889.
49 n 1 above at [171]-[174].
50 Tinsley n 3 above at 355 (Lord Goff dissenting).
51 ibid.
52 ibid at 364.
53 Apotex n 29 above at [13].
54 Bilta n 1 above at [62].
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balance of the equities in each case’.55 Thus, under the strict approach, the
‘effect of the illegality is not substantive but procedural’.56
Under the flexible approach, Lord Wilson (with whom Baroness Hale and
Lord Kerr agreed) held in Hounga that it is necessary to examine the policy
underlying the illegality defence, stating that
[t]he defence of illegality rests upon the foundation of public policy . . . ‘Rules
which rest upon the foundation of public policy, not being rules which belong
to the fixed or customary law, are capable, on proper occasion, of expansion or
modification’: Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co v Nordenfelt [1893] 1 Ch
630, 661 (Bowen LJ). So it is necessary, first, to ask ‘What is the aspect of public
policy which founds the defence?’ and, second, to ask ‘But is there another aspect
of public policy to which application of the defence would run counter?’57
The need to examine the underlying policies was also underscored by Lord
Hughes (with whom Lord Carnwath agreed) in Hounga,58 Lord Toulson in
Apotex59 and both him and Lord Hodge in Bilta.60 The clear implication is that
if the illegality defence is not justified by its underlying policies, it should fail,
which is the case in Hounga.
Critique
The majority’s approach to the illegality defence in Hounga, endorsed by Lords
Toulson and Hodge in Bilta and in a recent Court of Appeal decision,61 is
neither contrary to Tinsley nor Apotex. In the latter case, Lord Sumption held
that the illegality defence is not based ‘on the perceived balance of merits be-
tween the parties to any particular dispute’.62 He said that the illegality defence
did not permit the court ‘to make a value judgment about the seriousness of
the illegality and the impact on the parties of allowing the defence’.63 How-
ever, the majority’s reasoning in Hounga does not fall foul of that.64 The court
there did not reject the application of the illegality defence on the basis that
the defendant should not receive an unjustified windfall; nor did it say that the
illegality defence should fail because it would be unfair or unjust to the claimant
to deny her the remedy that she sought when compared to the nature or extent
of her turpitude or that of the defendant.65
55 ibid.
56 Tinsley n 3 above at 374 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
57 Hounga n 48 above at [42].
58 ibid at [55].
59 Apotex n 29 above at [57].
60 Bilta n 1 above at [171]-[174].
61 R (on the application of Best) v Chief Land Registrar [2015] EWCA Civ 17 (Best) at [51] per Sales LJ
(with whom McCombe LJ agreed); cf Arden LJ.
62 Apotex n 29 above at [13].
63 ibid at [19].
64 cf J. C. Fisher, ‘The ex turpi causa principle in Hounga and Servier’ (2015) 78 MLR 854, 860-861.
65 Although there are obiter remarks, in Hounga n 48 above, at [39], which might be read as
suggesting otherwise, they have to be interpreted in the context of Lord Wilson’s remarks
concerning the inextricably linked test.
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On the contrary, given that the illegality defence is a rule based on public
policies, a careful analysis of the majority’s judgment in Hounga shows that the
court was only examining the policies underlying the rule, and determining
whether they would be applicable to the facts of the case. Neither Tinsley
nor Apotex precludes the court from evaluating the policies underlying the
illegality defence and weighing them against a competing policy underlying
another applicable rule. Both cases only objected to the court weighing the
adverse consequences to the parties as a result of granting or refusing relief.
But that was not what the majority in Hounga did. Lord Wilson did not
weigh the ‘equities’ of the case by conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the
effect of applying the illegality defence on the claimant and defendant. Thus,
the majority’s approach in Hounga, ie, the flexible approach, does not entail
judging ‘the significance of the illegality or the consequences for the parties of
barring the claim’.66
Moreover, although it is stated in Tinsley that the application of the illegality
defence is ‘indiscriminate’,67 it is with reference to the effects the application
would have on the parties, particularly the claimant. It does not bar the court
from evaluating the policies underlying the rule, only the consequences for
the parties as a result of applying the rule, ie, Hounga is not incompatible with
Tinsley. After all, the Supreme Court in Hounga did examine and endorse the
reasoning of Tinsley which rejected the public conscience test and found no
consistency between that and the flexible approach. Lords Toulson and Hodge
are correct to say that Tinsley ‘did not preclude this court from adopting the
approach in Hounga . . . ’68 and ‘[n]o member of the court in Les Laboratoires
Servier suggested that the court’s approach inHounga v Allen had been wrong’.69
Tellingly, the Court of Appeal in a recent case held that Hounga ‘confirmed the
position arrived at in Tinsley’70 and stated that ‘the approach of the Supreme
Court in Les Laboratoires Servier is compatible with its approach in Hounga, and
in particular with the approach set out by LordWilson . . . ’,71 statements which
were not disapproved of by any of the judges in Bilta. Finally, Lord Sumption in
Bilta did not object to the reasoning or outcome in Hounga.72 Thus, contrary
to Lord Neuberger’s obiter remarks,73 it is unnecessary to depart from Tinsley
in order to support the flexible approach in Hounga.74
However, it might be said that even if the evaluation of public policies should
not be precluded where the application of the illegality defence would violate
or undermine the public policy underlying another rule of law, particularly a
statutory obligation or convention obligation as in the case of Bilta and Hounga,
66 Apotex n 29 above at [18] per Lord Sumption.
67 Tinsley n 3 above at 364D-E per Lord Goff.
68 Bilta n 1 above at [173].
69 ibid.
70 Best n 61 above at [52] per Sales LJ with whom McCombe LJ agreed. However, see Arden LJ’s
reservations at [111]-[112].
71 ibid at [61] per Sales LJ.
72 But he was sceptical, at [102], that the flexible approach applied by the majority in Hounga has
any broader significance beyond the facts of the case.
73 Bilta n 1 above at [17].
74 In any event, the power to depart from precedents should be exercised very sparingly: Jones v
Secretary of State for Social Services [1972] AC 944 per Lord Reid.
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it does not follow that courts have or ought to have a general discretion to
conduct such a balancing exercise where there is no conflicting or counter-
vailing public policy. Otherwise, such a discretionary balancing exercise does
not sit well with Tinsley which seems to require the illegality defence to be
automatically applied, at least insofar as the application does not contravene
or undermine public policies underlying a rule of law derived from statute or
convention.
Further, it might be said that a broad interpretation of the significance of
Tinsley and Apotex is as follows: the courts are prohibited from undertaking
any kind of discretionary weighing exercise even if it is the sort of structured
discretion recommended by the Law Commission, and regardless of whether it
pertains to the underlying polices of the illegality defence (which, it has been
argued, is permitted at the very least where its application would undermine
a competing or conflicting policy underlying another rule of law as in the
case in Hounga and Bilta) or the consequences for the parties (which Tinsley
prohibited). As Lord Sumption remarked, ‘[t]he fact that the illegality defence
is based on policy does not entitle a court to reassess the value or relevance of
that policy on a case-by-case basis’.75
But Lord Sumption’s obiter remark, endorsed by none of the other judges
in Bilta, went further than the holdings in Tinsley and Apotex. Neither of the
two cases raised or discussed the issue at stake in Hounga: whether the illegality
defence should apply to the case if its underlying policies are not furthered and
if permitting the defence will lead to the violation of another rule. In other
words, whether the rule of law in question (ie, the illegality defence) should
apply when it conflicts with another rule of law (which was a Convention
obligation in Hounga and a statutory provision in Bilta.) Neither Tinsley nor
Apotex addressed, let alone precluded, the evaluation of policies underlying two
conflicting rules of law in order to determine which rule should prevail.
Further and no less important, just as Tinsley is binding authority, so is
Hounga. The flexible approach adopted by the majority in Hounga formed the
basis of its ratio. The question then is whether the flexible approach in Hounga
has or should have any application to future cases. The Supreme Court did not
confine the application of the flexible approach to the facts of Hounga. And
there are no principled justifications for doing so. On the contrary, the illegality
defence should not be mechanically applied where doing so would contravene
another rule of law, particularly a statutory provision or convention obligation,
without regard for the purpose and policy of the statute and convention and the
policies underlying the illegality defence. It is submitted that unless and until the
Supreme Court refuses to follow Hounga, a fair and reasonable interpretation
of Hounga is that where the application of the illegality defence would violate
or undermine another rule of law, it is authority for the point that courts could
and should evaluate competing public policies. This is how the majority of the
Court of Appeal in Best understood Hounga,76 with whom Lords Toulson and
Hodge in Bilta agreed.77 Moreover, while Lord Sumption said in Bilta that he
75 Bilta n 1 above at [99].
76 Best n 61 above at [51]-[55].
77 n 1 above at [173].
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was sympathetic to Arden LJ’s analysis in Best which did not apply the flexible
approach in Hounga, neither of them was purporting to depart from Hounga
without saying so. Tellingly, Lord Sumption did not criticise the reasoning or
decision of the majority in Best.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in Bilta is to be commended for laying down clear rules
on the issue of whether the state of mind or acts of the directors or agents are
attributable to the company or principal in connection with a claim made by
the latter against the former (as well as their co-conspirators), as well as for
setting out the correct approach to the general issue of corporate attribution.
But where a company (particularly a one-man company) sues a third party
(particularly an auditor) for breach of duty, it is regrettable that the Court did
not provide clearer guidance on whether the intent or acts of its directors (or
sole director and shareholder) are attributable to the company in order to bar
its claim against the third party.
On the issue of the correct approach to the illegality defence, the flexible
approach exemplified by the majority’s reasoning in Hounga and endorsed by
Lords Toulson and Hodge in Bilta is not contrary to Tinsley. Further, the strict
approach is ‘indiscriminate’78 and ‘will often produce disproportionately harsh
consequences’.79 Moreover, the highest courts in various common law juris-
dictions have adopted a flexible approach,80 which decisions the Court would
‘undoubtedly wish to examine’81 in the future, and which ‘merit reading’.82
Accordingly, there is arguably more to be said for the flexible approach, if clear
and principled criteria are formulated as to the circumstances under which the
policies underlying the illegality defence should give way to opposing public
policies. In the interest of certainty and predictability, the Supreme Court has
to lay down clear and workable guidelines as to when and how competing
policies should be balanced. The Court should not avoid this difficult but vital
task by relying on the notion of ‘much seems to depend upon the circumstances
of the particular case’,83 which although defensible, is ‘the traditional refuge of
the judge who is unable to articulate a principle and wishes to retain maximum
flexibility’.84
78 Tinsley n 3 above, 355 per Lord Goff.
79 Apotex n 29 above at [18] per Lord Sumption.
80 See, for example, Nelson v Nelson (1995) 184 CLR 538 (HC Aust); Ting Siew May v Boon Lay
Choo [2014] 3 SLR 609 (Court of Appeal of Singapore). See also New Zealand’s Illegal Contracts
Act 1970; Catley v Herbert [1988] 1 NZLR 606; cf NZI Bank Ltd v Euro-National Corporation Ltd
[1992] 3 NZLR 528.
81 Bilta n 1 above at [174] per Lords Toulson and Hodge.
82 ibid.
83 See, for example, Woolwich Building Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1993] AC 70, 173 per
Lord Goff.
84 Lord Dyson, ‘Where the Common Law Fears to Tread. Annual Lecture for ALBA 2012’ (2013)
34(1) Statute Law Review 1, 2.
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No (,) More Bolam Please: Montgomery v Lanarkshire
Health Board
Clark Hobson∗
Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board concerned a negligent non-disclosure of certain risks
involved in natural birth. The Supreme Court departed from Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital,
which formerly governed negligent risk disclosure. A new test was adopted: risks that are
material must be disclosed, the materiality of a risk to be decided by reference to a reasonable
person in the patient’s position, or where the medical professional should be reasonably aware a
particular patient is likely to attach significance to that risk. The Court emphasised risk disclosure
practices must focus on what the patient wants to know. Yet the Court’s portrayal of this change
as a development of Sidaway is questionable. The decision is problematic in its engagement with
precedent, the new test’s future implications and statements regarding therapeutic privilege.
Despite rejecting Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee’s relevance to risk disclosure,
this case is likely to remain relevant.
INTRODUCTION
The value of autonomy is often seen as ‘by far the most significant value to
have influenced the evolution of contemporary medical law’.1 This value is
most invoked as the ethical lens that the legal practices relating to risk disclo-
sure (at times alternatively termed, if slightly incorrectly, informed consent2)
are seen through. In Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board3 (Montgomery),
the Supreme Court considered a claim brought by Nadine Montgomery.
She sought damages on behalf of her son, Sam Montgomery, for the severe
injuries he sustained as a result of complications during labour and delivery.
It was held that Mrs Montgomery’s consultant obstetrician and gynaecologist,
Dr Dina McLellan, was negligent in failing to disclose the risk of shoulder
dystocia that may have arisen from natural delivery, and failing to discuss, as a
direct result of these risks, the alternative possibility of delivering the baby by
caesarean section.
This was the first opportunity in thirty years, since the House of Lords
decision in Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital4 (Sidaway), that the Supreme
∗Teaching Fellow, University of Birmingham. I would like to thank Erika Rackley, Steven Vaughan,
Stephen Smith and the anonymous reviewer at the Modern Law Review for providing extensive
feedback on drafts of this commentary. All remaining errors are my own.
1 J. K. Mason and G. T. Laurie, Mason and McCall Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics (Oxford: OUP,
9th ed, 2013) 8.
2 Though Lady Hale did state in Montgomery n 3 below at [107], that the case provided the
opportunity to confirm the confident statement that the need for informed consent was firmly
part of English and Scottish law, see further T. K Feng, ‘Failure of Medical Advice: Trespass or
Negligence’ (1987) 7 LS 149. See, alternatively, J. Miola, ‘On the Materiality of Risk: Paper
Tigers and Panaceas’ (2009) 17 Med LR 76.
3 Montgomery (Appellant) v Lanarkshire Health Board (Respondent) (Scotland) [2015] UKSC 11.
4 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital and the Maudsley Hospital [1985] AC 871.
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Court has had to rule directly on the legal standards regulating information
provision and risk disclosure. In Sidaway, it was held that whether a medical
professional negligently failed to disclose a risk relating to medical treatment
was to be decided according to the test set out in Bolam v Friern Hospital
Management Committee5 (Bolam), otherwise known as the Bolam test. Bolam is
authority for the proposition that a medical professional will not be guilty of
negligence if they have acted in accordance with a practice accepted as proper
by a responsible body of medical practitioners. This is sometimes known as the
‘professional-practice’ test.6
Though the House of Lords has, since Sidaway, discussed the appropriate
standard of risk disclosure in relation to medical treatments in Chester v Afshar7
(Chester), Chester did not require a ruling on such standards, as it was primarily
concerned with causation. The Supreme Court in Montgomery was invited
to depart from Sidaway, and reconsider the duty of a medical professional to
disclose certain material risks when advising about treatment. It duly did, with
Mrs Montgomery succeeding in her claim.
Montgomery is highly significant for numerous reasons. Not only does the
decision impact upon the scope of the medical professional’s duty to disclose to
avoid negligent practice, but it comes amid claims that ‘[t]he common law no
longer sees the professions as somehow sacred or fragile assets of society, which
merit special protection’.8 Linked to this is a pervasive concern throughout
the leading joint judgment given by Lord Kerr and Lord Reed,9 and the short
‘footnote’ concurring judgment from Lady Hale,10 with what has been called
the concept of ‘jurisdiction’; the demarcation by the Court of a territory to
which it alone exclusively possesses the appropriate power to make determina-
tions on matters that arise.11 This is done by addressing the underlying nature
of the issues surrounding risk disclosure. As a result, the Court repeatedly em-
phasises one broad message: risk disclosure should change to focus on what the
patient wants to know rather than what the medical professional may wish to
provide.
This note will discuss how the Court reaches and portrays this message.
Whilst the approach in reaching this decision is commendable, it is not to be
welcomed uncritically. A large part of the cutting edge of Montgomery comes
from the Court trying to present its decision as a development of Sidaway,
when in reality Montgomery signifies an important departure from that case.
The Court could have been more explicit that this was a departure from
Sidaway, given the substance of the new test, rather than trying to reinterpret
5 [1957] 1 WLR 582.
6 In Scotland, the equivalent of the Bolam test is that test laid down by Lord President Clyde in
Hunter v Hanley 1955 SC 200.
7 [2004] UKHL 41. See Lord Hope at [48]-[59], and Lord Steyn at [15]-[19].
8 Lord Justice Jackson, ‘The Professions: Power, Privilege and Legal Liability’ (Professional Negli-
gence Bar Association Peter Taylor Memorial Lecture) 10 at https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/pnbalecture-_2_.pdf (last accessed 25 June 2015).
9 With whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, Lord Wilson, Lord Hodge, and Lady Hale (at [117]),
agreed.
10 n 3 above at [107]-[117]; [117].
11 See further K. Veitch, The Jurisdiction of Medical Law (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2007).
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the judgments in Sidaway in a manner most consistent with the message above.
Second, the Court does assert that autonomy is the dominant value underlying
risk disclosure (as opposed to beneficence). However, the Court also accepts
that in certain circumstances information as to risks can be justifiably withheld
from the patient by the medical professional. Coupled with trying to present
the case as a development from Sidaway, this invoking of the ‘therapeutic
privilege’ potentially allows for a more orthodox interpretation of Sidaway to be
restored, depending on how wide the circumstances are in which information
can be justifiably withheld. This is despite the Court confirming emphatically
that there was ‘no reason to perpetuate the application of the Bolam test in
this context any longer’.12 Finally, given that the purported irrelevance of
Bolam can be questioned, this means that the interpretation of the judgment
of Lord Bridge in Sidaway becomes particularly important. It is here that the
downplaying of elements of his Lordship’s judgment is in tension with one
interpretation as to the real reading of that judgment. This interpretation is one
which the Court might have assigned weight to, given its repeated emphasis
precisely on Montgomery as a development from the decision in Sidaway.
FACTS
Nadine Montgomery graduated with a BSc in molecular biology at Glasgow
University, and then went on to work as a hospital specialist for a pharmaceutical
company; this portrays Mrs Montgomery, as was noted in the Outer House of
the Court of Session, as ‘a clearly highly intelligent person’.13 Additionally, both
her mother and sister were general practitioners, meaning Mrs Montgomery
was able to avail herself of further independent professional support if needed.
Mrs Montgomery was also diabetic. Pregnant women who are diabetic are
likely to have larger than average babies. Mrs Montgomery was informed of
this during the course of her pregnancy. There is also greater risk of foetal
abnormalities and stillbirth in later stages of pregnancy, as well as mechanical
problems when giving birth. One of the reasons for potential mechanical
problems is that there can be a particular concentration of weight on the baby’s
shoulders. This can lead to shoulder dystocia, whereby the baby’s shoulders
become stuck above the pelvis. For all these reasons, Mrs Montgomery was
regarded as a high risk pregnancy requiring intensive monitoring.
Shoulder dystocia has been described as being ‘likely to engender an atmo-
sphere of crisis in the delivery room’,14 as well as ‘probably the most frightening
obstetric emergency that medical staff can encounter’.15 As well as presenting
risks to the mother, the manoeuvres required to free the baby can cause a
brachial plexus injury (whereby the nerve roots connecting the baby’s arm to
the spinal cord can become damaged). Further, the umbilical cord can become
trapped against the mother’s pelvis, and consequently may become occluded.
12 n 3 above at [86].
13 Nadine Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2010] CSOH 104 at [246].
14 Jones v North West Strategic Health Authority [2010] EWHC 178 (QB) at [51].
15 ibid.
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Occlusion of the umbilical cord can cause prolonged acute hypoxia, which in
turn can lead to cerebral palsy or death.
During Mrs Montgomery’s labour, shoulder dystocia did occur. There was
a 12-minute delay between delivering Sam Montgomery’s head, and the rest
of his body. Due to the manoeuvres used to resolve the shoulder dystocia, Sam
Montgomery suffered a brachial plexus injury that resulted in a permanent
disability: Erb’s palsy of the upper limb.16 Occlusion of the umbilical cord
also occurred. Later he sustained a 12-minute period of acute hypoxia. He
was diagnosed with cerebral palsy affecting all four limbs. Though the injuries
did occur as a result of the manoeuvres performed, it was held in the Outer
House and the Inner House of the Court of Session that Dr McLellan was
not negligent in the management of Mrs Montgomery’s labour.17 Indeed, this
was not appealed in the Supreme Court. Instead, it was invited to reconsider
the duty of a medical professional to a patient with regards to advice about
treatment, given the risk of shoulder dystocia itself and the crisis which can
result from its occurrence.18
The principal evidence given by Dr McLellan (which was not materially
in dispute) was that the risk of the occurrence of shoulder dystocia was 9–10
per cent with diabetic mothers. The risk of a brachial plexus injury following
shoulder dystocia was put at about 0.2 per cent, with the risk of cerebral palsy
or death put at less than 0.1 per cent.19 Mrs Montgomery was not told about
the risk of shoulder dystocia. Whilst Dr McLellan did accept the risk of the
occurrence of shoulder dystocia was high, it was argued that it was not her
practice to discuss these risks. This was precisely because of very small risk
of adverse consequences and the overwhelming likelihood that, if shoulder
dystocia was mentioned, many women would opt for a caesarean section.
Dr McLellan believed it was not ‘in the maternal interests for women to
have caesarean sections’.20 Whilst it was accepted that Mrs Montgomery had
expressed concern about the size of the foetus, and had done so at least more than
once,21 it was in dispute whether she had specifically questioned Dr McLellan
about the relevant risks of vaginal delivery.22
The case therefore presents, with its intricacies, a paradigmatic instance
of the risk disclosure scenario. There was a failure to disclose certain risks,
leading the appellant reluctantly to deliver vaginally, when she had repeatedly
emphasised concerns about her ability to do so, given her small stature and
the size of her baby.23 Mrs Montgomery’s negligence claim was rejected in
16 n 13 above at [3].
17 ibid at [198]; [205]-[206]; NM v Lanarkshire Health Board [2013] CSIH 3 at [64]-[66]. See further,
R. Heywood, ‘Negligent Antenatal Disclosure and Management of Labour’ (2011) 19 Med LR
140.
18 n 3 above at [4].
19 n 13 above at [229] See further at [171], [177]; n 17 above at [11]. Finally, see also the reliance
in both the leading judgment and Lady Hale’s judgment on the Royal College of Obstetricians
and Gynaecologists, Guideline No 42 on Shoulder Dystocia (ethical guidance, 2005), n 3 above at
[9]; [112].
20 n 3 above at [13]. See further n 13 above at [19]; n 17 above at [46]-[47].
21 n 3 above at [17]; n 13 above at [19].
22 n 13 above at [238]; [260]; n 17 above at [14]-[15]; [35]-[38].
23 n 3 above at [17]; [94].
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both the Outer House and the Inner House, Sidaway being influential in the
lower courts’ views on more recent developments in the law relating to risk
disclosure. The Supreme Court did not consider it necessary to engage in a
detailed discussion of causation and Chester, given that the majority found Mrs
Montgomery definitely would have had a caesarean section if informed of the
risks of the occurrence of shoulder dystocia.24
THE NEW TEST FOR RISK DISCLOSURE
As noted in the introduction, the majority of judges in Sidaway held that the
test governing the negligent non-disclosure of risks relating to medical treat-
ment was one based upon professional practice; that is, based upon Bolam.25
Yet, if their Lordships’ reasoning in Montgomery is provisionally set aside, and
the majority test in Sidaway is compared with the new standard for a med-
ical professional’s legal duty of risk disclosure (as set out in paragraph 87 of
Lord Kerr and Lord Reed’s judgment in Montgomery), the two tests initially
appear very different in nature. The new standard is one whereby the medical
professional is
under a duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the patient is aware of any mate-
rial risks involved in any recommended treatment, and of any reasonable alternative
or variant treatments. The test of materiality is whether, in the circumstances of
the particular case, a reasonable person in the patient’s position would be likely to
attach significance to the risk, or the doctor is or should reasonably be aware that
the particular patient would be likely to attach significance to it.26
This test stands in contrast to Sidaway, and replicates that put forward by the
Australian High Court in Rogers v Whitaker27 (Rogers). There are two limbs to
this duty of disclosure. The first limb explicitly reiterates the objective, rea-
sonable patient test. However, the second limb introduces a particular patient
approach to the law. In order for this limb to be activated though, the medical
professional must be reasonably aware, through the patient making their partic-
ular circumstances known to the medical professional, that that patient would
attach particular significance to that particular risk.
The difference between these two tests can be seen in the arguments for
them, and the values that constitute them. It is recognised by the Supreme
Court that the rationale behind the professional-practice test is that expert mat-
ters can only be judged by experts alike.28 It has also been asserted, more con-
sequentially, that the rationale for the professional-practice test is one whereby
‘if excessive liability is imposed upon the professions, indemnity insurance
premiums will escalate and the costs of that insurance will all be passed on
24 See n 3 above at [103]-[105].
25 n 4 above, 893 per Lord Diplock, 900 per Lord Bridge, 903-904 per Lord Templeman.
26 n 3 above at [87].
27 [1993] 4 Medical Law Reports 79.
28 n 3 above at [83].
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to clients/consumers’.29 In contrast, the argument for the duty of disclosure
in Montgomery is primarily based upon the principle of respecting a person’s
autonomy and choices in light of their character-values and convictions.
Applying the new test to the present case, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed con-
cluded that ‘there can be no doubt that it was incumbent on Dr McLellan to
advise Mrs Montgomery of the risk of shoulder dystocia’.30 Lady Hale was to
‘entirely agree’31 with this conclusion and judgment. Much like Jones v North
West Strategic Health Authority32 (Jones), it was necessary to focus on not just
the risk of the potential adverse consequences, but the risk of the occurrence
of shoulder dystocia. Jones was, factually, a very similar case concerning the
negligent non-disclosure of shoulder dystocia, and the non-disclosure of the
alternative of a caesarean section.33 Indeed, the Court’s reasons echo (with-
out explicitly referring to) Nicol J’s approach in Jones,34 highlighting shoulder
dystocia is ‘a major obstetric emergency requiring procedures that may be trau-
matic for the mother, and involving significant risks to her health’.35 Likewise,
and in contrast with the approach in the lower courts,36 Mrs Montgomery is
seen as the graduate-level educated professional with experience in the health
sector, who has repeatedly expressed concerns regarding her ability to deliver
vaginally.
SIDAWAY: DEVELOPMENT OR DEPARTURE?
As noted above, the two tests initially appear to be different in nature. Yet, when
Lord Kerr and Lord Reed initially discuss Sidaway in detail (after discussing the
approaches of the Outer House and the Inner House37), there is a noticeable
concern to promote the overarching message that change in the law relating
to risk disclosure is not a substantial departure from established principles. This
leads to two related problems. First, this is in tension with the more explicitly
critical aspects of the judgment, whereby the Court asserts its jurisdiction, and
addresses the underlying ethical rationale behind the practices of risk disclosure.
Second, in trying to frame Montgomery as a development of Sidaway, their
Lordships seem to (re)interpret the judgments in Sidaway in a manner designed
to show that the development from Sidaway to Montgomery is smooth, despite
the substance of the judgments in Sidaway arguably demonstrating this is not
the case.
It has previously been noted that ‘[f]rom a legal perspective [Sidaway] is a
mess’,38 in that there are three separate positions taken regarding to what degree
29 Jackson, n 8 above, 12.
30 n 3 above at [94].
31 ibid at [117].
32 n 14 above.
33 ibid at [3].
34 ibid at [50]. This was contrary to the approach of the Outer House in declining to follow Jones;
n 14 above at [28].
35 n 3 above at [94].
36 n 13 above at [248]; n 17 above at [37].
37 n 3 above at [29]-[39].
38 J. Miola and S. Fovargue, ‘How Much Information is Enough?’ (2010) 5 Clinical Ethics 13, 14.
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the professional-practice test (Bolam) should govern the risk disclosure scenario.
As noted in the Inner House,
although differing to some extent in the expression of their reasons, Lord Diplock,
Lord Bridge (with whom Lord Keith agreed) and Lord Templeman all concluded
that, in advising of the risks of an adverse outcome, essentially the same test of
liability applied as was applicable in the other aspects of medical practice.39
This reference to the same test of liability applicable in other aspects of med-
ical practice is the professional-practice test, ie, Bolam. Further, in contrast to
Lord Diplock, it is possible to interpret Lord Bridge and Lord Templeman as
holding that whilst the risk disclosure scenario was to be governed primarily
by the professional-practice test, there were circumstances in which the Court
could conclude, contrary to established professional practice, that a medical
professional ‘ought to draw the attention of a patient to a danger which may be
special in kind or in magnitude or special to the patient’.40 This interpretation
of Lord Bridge’s judgment will be contrasted later with an alternative reading
that fully promotes Bolam. However, reinterpreting each judgment with the
purpose of smoothing over the transition fromMontgomery to Sidaway not only
adds to what is already a complex decision, but also means that at times Lord
Kerr and Lord Reed may overstate their point that this smooth transition is
underpinned both in terms of precedent and legal doctrine.
Lord Kerr and Lord Reed state that in Sidaway, the question of whether the
test in Bolam should be applied in relation to risk disclosure ‘was approached in
different ways, but with a measure of overlap’.41 The overlap in the House of Lords’
reasoning in Sidaway, according to Lord Kerr and Lord Reed, is ‘the doctor’s
duty of care [follows] from the patient’s right to decide whether to undergo
the treatment recommended’.42 Whilst first quickly dismissing Lord Diplock’s
judgment in Sidaway,43 more substantial (and questionable) is their Lordship’s
discussion of the judgments of Lord Templeman and, as discussed later, Lord
Bridge. These are compared with the judgment of Lord Scarman, the most
ethically robust judgement in Sidaway, explicitly recognising and implementing
the principle of respect for autonomy. The Supreme Court notes in light
of Lord Scarman’s approach, medical evidence is needed only to establish
the probability and magnitude of the relevant harms should they occur. The
question of whether there has been a breach of duty, however, is ultimately not
a medical question.44 The Supreme Court is also clear that the practices of risk
disclosure are inherently ethical rather than relying on technical medical skill.
Lord Kerr and Lord Reed analyse the limits of the professional-practice test to
the duty of risk disclosure. It is first noted that:
39 n 17 above at [21].
40 n 4 above, 903. See also n 5 above, 900 per Lord Bridge.
41 n 3 above at [41] (emphasis added).
42 ibid at [56].
43 ibid at [42].
44 ibid at [48].
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The doctor’s advisory role cannot be regarded solely as an exercise of medical skill
without leaving out of account the patient’s entitlement to decide on the risks to her
health which she is willing to run . . . Responsibility for determining the nature
and extent of a person’s rights rests with the courts, not the medical professions.45
It is then recognised that the rationale behind the professional-practice test
(expert matters can only be judged by experts alike) cannot be used to justify
different practices of disclosure. According to the Supreme Court, different
practices of disclosure and the making of value judgments ‘are attributable not
to divergent schools of thought in medical science, but merely to divergent
attitudes among doctors as to the degree of respect owed to their patients’.46
Likewise, Lady Hale is equally robust in highlighting the ethical nature of
the giving of advice about risks, with specific reference to giving birth either
vaginally, or by caesarean section.47
However, in one respect, the judgment of Lord Kerr and Lord Reed goes
even further than that of Lord Scarman. In Sidaway, Lord Scarman notes that
‘the two critically important medical factors are the degree of probability of
the risk materialising and the seriousness of possible injury if it does’.48 The em-
phasised part of the quotation again appears to demonstrate that Lord Scarman
is concerned with the adverse consequences should the risk materialise, rather
than the occurrence of the risk itself. In tension with this and the Outer House49
and Inner House,50 the relevant factor for the Supreme Court in determining
whether the non-disclosure of risks by Dr McLellan was negligent was the
occurrence of the shoulder dystocia itself. This is important because it appears
that the principles underpinning even the judgment most supportive of the de-
cision inMontgomery have had to be extended. Whilst this might still be classed
as a development of Sidaway, the fact that Lord Scarman is in the minority in
Sidaway (holding that Bolam should not govern the risk-disclosure scenario51)
demonstrates the Supreme Court’s decision is an even further departure from
those judgments in Sidaway that advocate the professional-practice test.
More questionable is Lord Kerr and Lord Reed’s reframing of Lord Tem-
pleman’s judgment, holding that his Lordship ‘implicitly rejected the Bolam
test’,52 and that Lord Scarman’s reasoning was ‘in substance the same as Lord
Templeman’s: the doctor’s duty of care followed from the patient’s right to
decide whether to undergo the treatment recommended’.53 Lord Templeman’s
judgment in Sidaway at times asserts quite a paternalistic stance. While he did
believe that patients were allowed to reject ‘advice for reasons which are ratio-
nal, irrational or for no reason’,54 to state that at the heart of his judgment is the
45 ibid at [83] (emphasis added). See also this discussion, in the context of Lord Bridge’s caveat in
Sidaway, at ibid [61].
46 ibid at [84].
47 ibid at [115].
48 n 4 above, 889.
49 n 13 above at [233].
50 n 17 above at [23].
51 n 4 above, 882, 885, 888-889.
52 n 3 above at [55].
53 ibid at [56].
54 n 4 above, 904.
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patient’s right to judge whether to undergo the treatment recommended again
involves the Court embarking on revision with hindsight. Lord Templeman is
explicit in stating:
I do not subscribe to the theory that the patient is entitled to know everything . . .
An obligation to give a patient all the information available to the doctor would
often be inconsistent with the doctors contractual obligation to have regard to the
patient’s best interests.55
The promotion of autonomy, in light of this argument, rings hollow. How is
the patient able to exercise a right to judge whether to undergo treatment, if the
medical professional is to gauge howmuch information to tell the patient on the
basis of her medical experience and training?56 Therefore, this reinterpretation
again shifts the basic presumption of his Lordship’s judgment, this time from a
judgment grounded primarily in (if anything) the value of beneficence to one
grounded primarily in the value of autonomy.
Indeed, that Lord Kerr and LordReed also argue that Lord Bridge’s judgment
in Sidaway ‘might be thought to arrive at a position not too distant from
that of Lord Scarman’,57 reached by focussing on the ‘caveat’ given to Lord
Bridge’s holding that the degree of disclosure necessary was to be governed
by Bolam, further substantiates the conclusion of the Court. That conclusion
is that there is room for development in the law relating to risk disclosure
without fundamental change, as Sidaway does not give that much priority to
Bolam. Whether this is strictly speaking true does not seem too concerning for
the majority of the Supreme Court.58 Given the Supreme Court is entitled to
overrule Sidaway, it is surprising that they seek to reinterpret the case at all.
One reason for this might be because the Outer House59 and Inner House60 do
engage in quite lengthy defences of Sidaway. It might be that this ‘smoothing
over’ is one way of dealing with these defences. Direct concern with the Court
of Sessions’ decisions takes up 12 paragraphs of Lord Kerr’s and Lord Reed’s
55 ibid.
56 J. Miola, Medical Ethics and Medical Law: A Symbiotic Relationship (Oxford: Hart 2007) 61.
57 n 4 above at [53].
58 There has also been a plethora of comment regarding whether Lord Woolf MR in Pearce v United
Bristol NHS Healthcare Trust [1999] PIQR 53, 59 (Pearce) had already introduced the reasonable
patient test (in England and Wales). For representative arguments that Pearce does introduce the
reasonable patient test, See M. Brazier and J. Miola, ‘Bye Bye Bolam: A Medical Litigation
Revolution?’ (2000) 8 Med LR 85, 110. See also R. Heywood, ‘Subjectivity in Risk Disclosure:
Considering the Position of the Particular Patient’ (2009) 25 (1) PN 3, 4. See also Heywood,
n 17 above, 146. Finally, see K. Mason and D. Brodie, ‘Bolam, Bolam—Wherefore Art Thou
Bolam?’ (2005) 9 Edin LR 298, 301. For arguments that Pearce simply refines Sidaway and does not
introduce a reasonable patient standard into the law, see A. Maclean, ‘The Doctrine of Informed
Consent: Does it Exist and Has it Crossed the Atlantic?’ (2004) 24 LS 386, 407-410. See also A.
Maclean, ‘From Sidaway to Pearce and Beyond: Is the Legal Regulation of Consent any Better
Following a Quarter of a Century of Judicial Scrutiny?’ (2012) Med LR 108, 117-121. Again,
this extensive debate appears to be of little concern to their Lordships, who attempt to deal with
subsequent case law post-Sidaway in a mere six paragraphs. See n 3 above at [63]-[69].
59 n 13 above at [230]-[235].
60 n 17 above at [17]-[30].
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judgment.61 Even so, this smoothing over does not chime with the substance
of the decisions in Sidaway.
All this shows just how important is the portrayal of the message that change
is needed in the law of risk disclosure. The majority of the Supreme Court
is willing to emphasise those principles and values embedded in previous case
law that support the proposition that a medical professional must disclose (at
least) those risks that a reasonable patient in those circumstances would find
significant. It is questionable whether the level of emphasis given to the value
of autonomy is consistent with a close reading of Sidaway.
BOLAM’S POTENTIAL RELEVANCE (1): THE
THERAPEUTIC PRIVILEGE
Sidaway is also used by Lord Kerr and Lord Reed to demonstrate substantively
why change is necessary in relation to risk disclosure. Here the Court continues
to assert its jurisdiction, as well as to substantiate the argument that autonomy
is the dominant value underpinning risk disclosure practices. It is first noted
that ‘[t]he significance attached in Sidaway to a patient’s failure to question the
doctor is however profoundly unsatisfactory’. There is an appropriate focus on
the possibility of the doctor-patient relationship being unilateral in nature, due
to ‘social and psychological realities of the relationship between a patient and
her doctor’. Not only was the question raised of how those patients lacking
information about risks they face could question a medical professional, more
pertinent to Mrs Montgomery’s case, it was argued that ‘this approach leads
to the drawing of excessively fine distinctions between questioning, on the
one hand, and expressions of concern falling short of questioning, on the
other’.62 Indeed, it was argued in the Outer House that there was no substantive
difference between Mrs Montgomery’s repeated raising of concerns regarding
vaginal delivery and asking specifically about these risks.63 Lord Reed and Lord
Kerr also analyse the medical and social settings in which the practices of risk
disclosure have developed to give expression to the increasing importance of
respecting a person’s autonomy. Despite being easily able to find the promotion
of autonomy in Sidaway earlier, they note
[s]ince Sidaway, it has become increasingly clear that the paradigm of the doctor-
patient relationship implicit in those speeches in that case has ceased to reflect the
reality and complexity of the way in which health services are provided.64
Lady Hale takes a similar approach, relying on various sources of dis-
course to substantiate her discussion of pregnancy, risks to the mother and
child, and the role of the medical professional in offering pregnant women
61 n 3 above at [26]-[38].
62 ibid at [58].
63 n 13 above at [151]-[152].
64 n 3 above at [75].
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‘evidence-based information to support and enable them to make informed
decisions’.65
This reasoning is to be welcomed. If respect for autonomy is seen as a pos-
itive obligation to buttress the understanding of others and place the patient
in a position (in terms of information, emotions, situation etc) where they
can act according to their character-values and convictions, then the distinc-
tion between specific questions and the raising of concerns is one without
a difference. This translates into there being different standards of a med-
ical professional’s duty of disclosure, unsupported by principle. Here then
is the active willingness of the Court to distance itself (substantively) from
Sidaway.
But despite this promotion of autonomy, this does not mean that the value
of beneficence loses all significance inMontgomery. Indeed this is the first point
where, despite Lady Hale noting Bolam has become ‘quite inapposite’66 within
risk disclosure practices, there may still be scope for Bolam to have an influence
in this area of the law.
This is due to their Lordships immediately qualifying the standard by stating
that a medical professional is ‘entitled to withhold from the patient information
as to a risk if he reasonably considers that its disclosure would be seriously
detrimental to the patient’s health’;67 in other words, there is the availability of
the ‘therapeutic privilege’. Concerns have been raised about this defence that
in principle grants medical professionals the ability to withhold information
based upon professional practice.68 Not only does the Court state the disclosure
of risks must be reasonably considered seriously detrimental to the patient’s health,
appearing to imply a fairly wide formulation of the therapeutic privilege, what
is also worrying in this context is that it was considered ‘unnecessary for the
purposes of this case to consider in detail the scope of those exceptions’,69
other than sounding a general warning that the therapeutic privilege should
not be abused, and that it is a limited exception.70
The therapeutic privilege is not unknown in English case law. In Pearce v
United Bristol Healthcare NHS Trust,71 Lord Woolf appeared to acknowledge the
existence of the therapeutic privilege, noting that
the doctor, in determining what to tell a patient, has to take into account all the
relevant considerations, which include the ability of the patient to comprehend
what he has to say to him or her and the state of the patient at that particular time,
both from the physical point of view and an emotional point of view.72
65 ibid at [116]. See also ibid at [109]-[112].
66 ibid at [115].
67 ibid at [88].
68 M. Brazier, ‘Patient Autonomy and Consent to Treatment: The Role of the Law?’ (1987) Legal
Stud 169, 188.
69 n 3 above at [88].
70 ibid at [91].
71 n 58 above.
72 ibid, 59.
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Likewise, as Hodkinson acknowledges,73 an analogous reference to the ther-
apeutic privilege has been made in relation to withholding information from
parents about their deceased child’s post-mortem in AB and Others v Leeds
Teaching Hospital NHS Trust and Another.74 Whilst in that case the blanket
practice in question of not disclosing details of post-mortem procedures was
negligent, one main reason why this was negligent was that the practice ‘had
not been carried out on a case-by-case-basis’.75 Lord Steyn was also to note
in Chester that ‘there may be wholly exceptional cases where objectively in
the best interests of the patient the surgeon may be excused from giving a
warning’.76 Most significantly is the widest formulation (and that most similar
to Montgomery) of Lord Scarman in Sidaway, where he states that it is ‘plainly
right that a doctor may avoid liability for a failure to warn of a material risk
if he can show that he reasonably believed the communication . . . would be
detrimental . . . to the health of his patient’.77
Whilst this might not quite collapse the differences between Lord
Scarman’s approach and that of his fellow Lordship’s in Sidaway (given his
rejection of Bolam) in speaking about how a reasonable belief on behalf of the
medical professional that providing information as to risks would be detri-
mental to the patient’s health, this still appears to leave quite a large space for
the professional-practice test to operate in. Though the Supreme Court talks
about the reasonable belief of serious harm, two problems arise. The first is
not just that this formulation is vague, but that the Supreme Court fails to
recognise that it needs to be more specific, precisely because it has separated
out the therapeutic privilege from the new test for risk disclosure. Under the
professional-practice test for risk disclosure itself, there is an allowance for the
justified withholding of information, as this is still based upon clinical judg-
ment. That is, a separate exception is not needed.78 Second, the importance of
Montgomery as a development from Sidaway once again becomes pertinent. One
argument that might be made is that because of the emphasis on the continuum
of development from Sidaway, especially from Lord Scarman’s judgment, and
the similarities of the formulations of the therapeutic privilege,Montgomery has
not done anything to narrow the range of circumstances in which the thera-
peutic privilege, and thus the professional-patient test, may apply. Whilst the
notion of ‘significant harms’ might be thought to be one limitation, this is a
vague notion itself.79
This vague discussion is compounded by the slightly disingenuous approach
the majority takes to replicating both the new test for risk disclosure and the
scope of the therapeutic privilege in Rogers. Further guidance could have been
given as to how the therapeutic privilege will operate in practice by engaging in
more detail with Rogers itself, rather than stating that ‘it is unnecessary to discuss
73 K. Hodkinson, ‘The Kneed to Know—Therapeutic Privilege: A Way Forward’ (2013) 21 Health
Care Analysis 105.
74 [2004] 3 FCR 325.
75 ibid, 327 per Gage J.
76 n 7 above at [18].
77 n 4 above, 888. See also ibid, 904 per Lord Templeman.
78 Hodkinson, n 73 above, 115.
79 ibid, 117.
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[comparative law] in detail’.80 This is further compounded by the fact that the
formulation of the therapeutic privilege in the joint judgment in Rogers refers
to the justified withholding of information when disclosure of that risk will
‘harm an unusually nervous, disturbed or volatile patient’.81 This formulation
appears narrower than that discussed in Montgomery, and in turn appears to be
more considerate of the principle that a patient’s autonomy should be respected.
Thus, the Supreme Court is committed in principle to abandoning Bolam in
relation to risk disclosure, as is consistent with its message. Given the explicit
highlighting of the therapeutic privilege, it is likely that the professional-practice
test will still be available in principle. How often and widely this is used remains
to be seen. Yet, in stating that respect for autonomy underpins the new rea-
sonable patient test inMontgomery, and separating this out from the therapeutic
privilege, the importance of placing clear limits on this privilege becomes vital.
Again, the Supreme Court creates an issue for itself (the continued relevance
of Bolam) that it does not resolve with any real clarity.
BOLAM’S POTENTIAL RELEVANCE (2): LORD BRIDGE IN SIDAWAY
It has been shown above that through the therapeutic privilege, the professional-
practice test/Bolam may still have a role to play in the law governing risk dis-
closure. However, it is arguable that in portrayingMontgomery as a development
from Sidaway, this inadvertently should have allowed Bolam to be considered rel-
evant in another way. This stems from Lord Kerr and Lord Reed’s interpretation
of Lord Bridge’s judgment in Sidaway, one which is in tension with an alter-
native interpretation which might have been assigned greater weight, precisely
because Lord Kerr and Lord Reed are so concerned to portray Montgomery as
developing the law.
As noted above, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed conclude that Lord Bridge’s
judgment is not too far from Lord Scarman’s in Sidaway, by focussing on Lord
Bridge’s ‘caveat’ to Bolam; in certain circumstances the courts could find that
disclosing certain risks was so necessary to the patient making an informed
choice, that no reasonable medical professional, ‘recognising and respecting his
patients right of decision’, would fail to disclose that risk. Lord Bridge further
notes that the ‘kind of case’ in mind is a procedure ‘involving a substantial risk
of grave adverse consequences’82 (again, as opposed to the occurrence of that risk
for the Supreme Court). This passage, when read appropriately, ‘narrowed the
gap between his position and that of Lord Scarman’.83 The appropriate way to
read that passage, according to the Supreme Court, is to not focus excessively
on the notion of ‘grave adverse consequences’. His Lordship was ‘merely giving
an example’ of the 10 per cent risk of stroke to ‘illustrate’ the important point to
concentrate on; there may be circumstances where disclosure is a must, where
80 n 4 above at [70].
81 n 27 above, 83. For a further comparative analysis as to the scope of the therapeutic privilege in
international jurisdictions, see Hodkinson, n 73 above, 114.
82 n 4 above, 900.
83 n 3 above at [52].
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‘no reasonably prudent medical man would fail to make it’. This standard of
the reasonably prudent medical professional is any professional who recognises
and respects his patient’s right of decision.84
Here, we begin to see a downplaying of certain important elements of Lord
Bridge’s ‘caveat’; the highlighting of the 10 per cent risk of a stroke is now
merely an ‘illustration’ of a general proposition. But perhaps a more appropriate
reading, given that Lord Bridge goes on to state that ‘no reasonably prudent
medical man’85 would fail to disclose the 10 per cent risk of stroke, is one
whereby the example illustrates that the breach of Bolam is self-evident. This
has been argued by Jonathan Montgomery to be ‘an appeal to the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur’86 (the evidence of breach being obvious to the judge). If this
is correct, then it can be concluded that the example illustrates a principle of
responsible professional judgment; likewise there is less room in using Bolam for
the judiciary to also assert its jurisdiction and set standards.87 All the while, the
continuity professed between Sidaway andMontgomery presents an unnecessary,
and potentially ill-founded, attempt to argue for the irrelevance of Bolam, when
the relevance of Bolam can be substantiated in Lord Bridge’s ‘caveat’, a caveat
the Supreme Court relies upon.
Further, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed are also explicit later in stating that pre-
vious cases (including both lower court decisions) have been wrong to take the
particular example given as of central importance, ‘rather than . . . the prin-
ciple which the example was intended to illustrate’.88 But if risk perception
does differ from individual to individual,89 then a quantified example cannot
illustrate a particular patient principle. It can illustrate a reasonable patient prin-
ciple (provided reasonable patients think that the risk of grave adverse harm
is relevant to their decisions); it could also illustrate a principle of professional
judgment, and again Bolam may become relevant. Still, at this point, Lord Kerr
and Lord Reed’s interpretation of Lord Bridge’s judgment does not do the
work they think it does. This all stems from the initial, constraining commit-
ment, to show Montgomery as developing the law. Additionally, it is arguable,
given the extent to which their Lordships focus on a ‘merely illustrative’ ex-
ample, that the example was intended to be used, and subsequently was used,
as a representative way of illustrating when the principle that it is necessary
to disclose would be engaged. As such, it may have taken on a more im-
portant symbolism than Lord Kerr and Lord Reed give credit for, especially
since there is a concern to display continuity with Sidaway.90 Again though, all
these problems appear to be of the Court’s own making. Lord Bridge’s ‘caveat’
84 ibid at [53].
85 n 4 above, 900.
86 J. Montgomery, ‘Medicine, Accountability, and Professionalism’ (1989) 16 JL & Soc 319, 323
(emphasis in original).
87 ibid.
88 n 3 above at [62].
89 T. L. Beauchamp and J. F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford: OUP, 7th ed, 2013)
235-236. See also R. Heywood, A. Macaskill and K. Williams, ‘Informed Consent in Hospital
Practice: Health Professionals’ Perspectives and Legal Reflections’ (2010) 18 Med LR 15. See,
finally, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed’s support of this proposition, n 3 above at [46].
90 This is substantiated (as noted) by the decisions of the lower courts; see n 14 above at [233]; n 18
above at [29]. See also Pearce n 58 above, 59 per Lord Woolf.
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would have been less relevant if the Supreme Court had been more overt about
Montgomery being a departure from Sidaway, rather than trying to emphasise
continuity with that case.
What clinches the point for their Lordships that Lord Bridge’s position is
not too far from Lord Scarman’s is the reading of the entirety of his ‘caveat’
(now referred to as a ‘passage’).91 In doing so, Lord Kerr and Lord Reed
take Lord Bridge to endorse the approach that the primary ‘question for the
judge is whether disclosure of a risk was so obviously necessary to an informed
choice on the part of the patient that no doctor who recognised and respected
his patient’s right of decision and was exercising reasonable care would fail
to make it’.92 This is a further, arguably more deceptive sleight of hand by
their Lordships. Whilst it has also been argued that Lord Bridge and Lord
Templeman are closer to the objective, reasonable patient test than previously
considered,93 it is generally accepted and explicitly recognised by the Court that
Lord Bridge rejected the ‘North American doctrine of informed consent’,94
and that the question of breach was ‘to be decided primarily on the basis of
expert medical evidence, applying the Bolam test’.95 To therefore readily imply
that the vital question the judges must ask themselves is one which focuses
upon the disclosure being necessary for an informed choice on the part of the
patient overlooks the basic presumption Lord Bridge’s approach is grounded
on (professional-practice) and seeks to re-ground his approach in an entirely
different one (the needs of the patient). Given medical professionals are much
more heavily favoured by the former basic presumption than the latter (all other
things being equal), this shows the importance of change to the Court.
Overall therefore, if the change in the law is this important to the Supreme
Court, it bears returning to the point that has already been made many times:
it would have been far clearer (and easier) for the Court to explicitly note
that Montgomery signifies a large departure from Sidaway. Indeed, in trying to
demonstrate the continuity with Sidaway, it invites further criticisms of the
Court’s approach in relying on Lord Bridge’s judgment, one that, arguably,
shows the continuing importance and relevance of Bolam.
CONCLUSIONS
It is unfortunate that more focus could not be given to Lady Hale’s judg-
ment. It is hoped that this judgment will at least play a part specifically in
discussions about a medical professional’s legal and ethical duty to disclose risks
in pregnancy and childbirth. The judgment itself does seem to have a very
specific purpose, with a focus on caesarean section being a low-risk, routine
alternative for mothers,96 and an attendant refocus on the risks to, and giving
91 n 3 above at [53].
92 ibid at [53].
93 See Miola, n 2 above, 103.
94 n 3 above at [51].
95 n 4 above, 900.
96 n 3 above at [110]; [113].
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decision-making back to the pregnant woman.97 Nonetheless, it is arguable that
Lady Hale’s approach involves an over-simplification of the National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) guidelines. This guideline is over
276 pages long, including an ‘algorithm’ to determine whom to offer a cae-
sarean section to, whom not to, taking into account maternal requests, planning
the place of birth, pregnancy and childbirth after a previous caesarean section,
procedural and surgical aspects of a caesarean section, and post-caesarean section
care, the latter two headings being yet further sub-divided.98
Ultimately, the decision inMontgomery is sensitive to the extent that the value
of autonomy constitutes the legal and ethical practices of risk disclosure. This
necessitates the move away from Bolam, and its endorsement in Sidaway, despite
the Court’s reliance on the judgments in Sidaway (especially Lord Bridge’s)
which do give prominence to the professional-practice test. In substance, there
is the largely legitimate creation of a space by which the Court now has
the primary authority to pronounce on matters relating to risk disclosure.
In articulating the reasonable patient test coupled with a further conditional
particular patient standard, Montgomery has at least symbolically gone further
than ever before in protecting patient autonomy. Yet it appears that there is
much still to be articulated about the relationship of the therapeutic privilege
to the standard of disclosure set out by Montgomery. Future decisions could do
worse than look abroad for further guidance as to how these two elements
fit together, bearing in mind that the privilege here has been formulated in a
narrow manner. Whilst ‘the full majesty of the Bolam test’ no longer continues
to hold sway,99 it is not quite time to say bye-bye Bolam for good.
97 ibid at [111]; [114]-[115].
98 NICE Clinical Guideline 132, Caesarean section (2011) 1, 3-7. Thanks to the anonymous reviewer
who suggested this implication of Lady Hale’s judgment.
99 Jackson, n 8 above, 12.
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